











Lancaster University Management School 







Short Term Gain, Long Term Pain. The Effect 







Colin Green  
 
 
The Department of Economics                        
Lancaster University Management School 




© Colin Green  
All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed 
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission, 
provided that full acknowledgement is given. 
 
The LUMS Working Papers series can be accessed at http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/publications/ 
LUMS home page: http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/ Short Term Gain, Long Term Pain. The E⁄ect





Informal job search methods could alleviate short-term labour market
di¢ culties of displaced workers by providing information on job opportu-
nities, allowing them to signal their productivity and may mitigate wage
losses through better post-displacement job matching. However if dis-
placement results from reductions in demand for speci￿c sectors/skills,
the use of informal job search methods may increase the risk of job insta-
bility. We examine the e⁄ect of jobs search methods on post-displacement
outcomes. While informal job search methods are associated with shorter
unemployment duration, and lower wage losses, they lead to increased job
instability and increased risk of subsequent job displacement.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
The sizeable individual welfare losses associated with worker displacement
are well documented. For instance, displaced workers have problems with re-
employment, and after re-employment are often underemployed and face signif-
icant wage reductions (Podgursky and Swaim 1987, Kletzer 1989, Farber 1993,
Jacobson et al 1993, Burda and Mertens 2001). In addition, the experience of
displacement is associated with ongoing job instability (Stevens 1997), and there
is evidence displacement has negative intergenerational e⁄ects (Oreopoulos et
al 2008).
This paper examines the e⁄ect of job search methods on re-employment out-
comes for displaced workers. While there is a long standing interest in the job
search methods of unemployed workers (Rees 1966, Bradshaw 1973, Datcher
1983, Holzer 1987a, Holzer 1988, Montgomery 1991, Osberg 1993, Addison and
Portugal 2002), little is know about the role of job search methods in post-
displacement outcomes. This paper presents evidence that informal job search
methods, directly approaching employers or using friends/relatives, are associ-
ated with shorter unemployment duration after displacement and lower wage
losses between the displacement and re-employment job when compared to for-
mal job search methods. However, re-employment through informal methods is
associated with markedly higher turnover rates, and in particular, an increased
likelihood of experiencing another displacement episode. Together these results
suggest that informal job search methods may help to alleviate the short term
consequences of displacement but may lead to more long terms problems with
2ongoing employment instability.
There are a number of reasons why job search methods are of speci￿c interest
in the case of displaced workers. First, one source of the negative consequences
of displacement relates to its potential to generate adverse signals of productiv-
ity to employers (Gibbons and Katz 1991, Abbring et al 2002). Employers may
suspect selectivity in the lay-o⁄ patterns of the prior employer and take dis-
placement as a signal of undesirable working qualities in the individual. Hence,
displaced workers may ￿nd themselves stigmatised in the labour market. The
use of inside knowledge of job opportunities and personal references may repre-
sent one way that the displaced can reduce adjustment problems and counteract
the negative information conveyed to potential employers by job loss through
displacement. Moreover, in the case that displacement was genuinely unrelated
to work performance, the ability to use direct employer contacts or employ-
ment referrals by friends or relatives may allow individuals to signal their ￿ true￿
productivity to potential employers. Alternatively, social networks may provide
increased information about employment opportunities. In both cases the use of
informal job networks would be associated with shorter post-displacement unem-
ployment duration. Whilst, the former potential role for informal job networks,
as a productivity signal, would also be expected to reduce post-displacement
wage losses.
Second, it has been demonstrated that a major source of post-displacement
welfare losses are due to increased job instability in subsequent employment
spells (Stevens 1997). Individuals are more likely to have informal job networks
3in their own industry and/or occupation. Hence, the use of informal job search
methods may be associated with a greater likelihood of being re-employed in
a job similar to that which the worker was displaced from. If there is a gen-
eral reduction in the demand for output associated with these jobs, the use of
these networks by displaced workers may contribute to further job insecurity.
Hence, while access to informal job networks may alleviate immediate post-
displacement problems related to the initial unemployment spell it may also
lead to poor quality job matches and ongoing job instability.
Evidence on the role of job search methods for the unemployed in general has
demonstrated that the use of informal job search methods, such as contacting
friends/relatives or directly approaching employers, is associated with more job
o⁄ers and shorter durations of unemployment (Holzer 1988, Blau and Robins
1990, Bentolila et al 2009). Whereas formal methods, and in particular the
use of Public Employment Agencies (PEA) are a relatively poor source of job
o⁄ers and are associated with longer periods of unemployment (Blau and Robins
1990, Bishop 1993, Ports 1993, Gregg and Wadsworth 1996). It has also been
suggested that the use of employee referrals may allow employers to avoid paying
e¢ ciency wages, insofar as the presence of friends/relatives (i.e. referrers) within
the ￿rm may provide alternative method of employee monitoring (Kugler 2003).
As a result, whilst the use of informal job search methods may lead to less time
in unemployment, it may be associated with lower subsequent wages.
This discussion leads to a number of research questions. Are there systematic
di⁄erences in the method of re-employment used by displaced workers? Do
4displaced workers who use informal job search have shorter periods of post-
displacement labour market inactivity than those who use formal job search
methods? What are the wage e⁄ects of ￿nding re-employment through informal
job search methods? Does re-employment through informal networks lead to
further job insecurity and/or a greater risk of subsequent displacement?
This paper addresses these questions using Australian longitudinal data that
is advantageous in analysing the link between job search methods and post-
displacement outcomes. This data contains information on individuals￿ job
search methods, job ￿nding methods, displacement episodes along with de-
tailed duration data and information on post-displacement employment out-
comes. The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we utilise compet-
ing risk techniques to assess the e⁄ect of job search methods on the duration of
post-displacement labour market unemployment. Second, we assess the in￿ u-
ence of job search methods on re-employment earnings. Finally, we estimate the
impact of job search methods on post-displacement job stability, with particular
emphasis on the risk of further displacement. Hence, this study provides the ￿rst
evidence on job search methods of displaced workers and is the ￿rst econometric
study of the impact of job search methods on re-employment matching.
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 discusses the
data used, section 3 presents the results and section 4 concludes.
II. DATA AND BACKGROUND
The data source used is the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Survey of
Employment and Unemployment Patterns (herein referred to as SEUP). SEUP
5covers the period from the start of September 1994 to the end of August 1997.
The survey was conducted in three waves:
1. Wave 1: 5th September 1994 to 3rd September 1995;
2. Wave 2: 4th September 1995 to 1st September 1996; and
3. Wave 3: 2nd September 1996 to 31st August 1997.
Whilst 7,572 people were originally interviewed, the sample size was reduced
by attrition to 6,056 by the end of wave 3. Individuals selected for the survey
were aged 15-59 and living in a private residence as at May 1995. SEUP has
an unusual sample framework. Respondents were split into two subgroups, Job-
seekers and a Population Reference Group (PRG). The PRG is a random sample
of the population, the Jobseekers group oversamples those who are unemployed,
￿it comprises individuals who were considered to be potential candidates for a
labour market program at the time of recruitment￿(Le and Miller 1998). It
must be noted that the PRG and Jobseeker group are not mutually exclusive,
the PRG contains some Jobseekers.
The de￿nition of worker displacement is constrained by the question in SEUP
that addresses reasons for retrenchment. This question uses the standard ABS
labour force de￿nition, whereby loss of work through retrenchment consists of
dismissal due to business closing, dismissal for reasons of insu¢ cient labour
demand that does not involve a business closure and dismissal for poor per-
formance for reasons unrelated to business conditions. The latter case is not
generally considered a job loss due to displacement. However, Borland and
McDonald (2001) report ABS ￿ndings that three quarters of ABS de￿ned re-
6trenchment is associated with the former two categories. Our sample consists of
all individuals who lose a job through retrenchment during the ￿rst two waves of
SEUP. This provides 1,584 individuals. In the case of an individual experiencing
multiple displacement episodes we constrain our analysis to the ￿rst episode. In
line with existing research on job displacement we focus on male displaced work-
ers only, leaving 987 individuals. Appendix Table 1 provides selected summary
statistics for this sample.
Before continuing it is worth mentioning the unemployment bene￿ts scheme
in Australia as it was at the time of SEUP. First, unemployment insurance was
not means tested. Second, there is no unemployment insurance cut-o⁄period in
Australia or reduction in the replacement ratio over time. Individuals continue
to have access to the same level of unemployment bene￿ts irrespective of time in
unemployment. Detailed information on unemployment insurance receipt was
not available in SEUP.
A strength of SEUP as a data source lies in its episodic structure. For each of
the waves, information is gathered for every employment, unemployment, not in
labour force, training and social security episode experienced by the individual
within the sample period. We observe, and have the characteristics of, every
labour market episode that occurs during SEUP￿ s sample period. In addition,
SEUP contains detailed information on job search methods and it also identi￿es
the method used to gain any employment episodes. Hence there is a distinction
between job search methods, which relate to ex ante search behaviour (i.e. be-
fore ￿nding a job), and job ￿nding methods, which report the actual method
7used to gain a given job. The speci￿c job search methods reported in SEUP
are direct employer contact; answering newspaper advertisements; checking fac-
tory or Public Employment Agency (PEA) noticeboards (which at the time of
SEUP was the Commonwealth Employment Service, CES); registering with the
PEA; contacting other employment agencies; advertised or tendered for work;
and contacted friends or relatives. This information is recorded for every un-
employment episode; and for every employment episode a job ￿nding method
is recorded. Job search methods are not mutually exclusive. Unemployed indi-
viduals can be recorded as undertaking multiple job search methods. Only one
job ￿nding method is recorded for each employment episode.
INSERT TABLE 1
Table 1 provides information on the ex ante job search method used by our
sample of displaced workers, along with summary information on ex post job
￿nding methods for displaced workers. Speci￿cally, the job search method refers
to any use of that job search method during the displacement-unemployment
episode. Hence, it is a measure of incidence, not intensity, of use. The data
suggest that the use of the PEA (70%), direct employer contact (71%) and
answering newspaper advertisements (57.3%) are the main job search methods
used by displaced workers. Displaced job seekers do not generally follow a
single strategy for seeking a job. On average, the displaced used 2.49 di⁄erent
search methods.1 It is worth noting that as this data refers to job search use
during the unemployment spell, search methods that are associated with longer
unemployment duration will be over-represented. In the last three columns we
8report data that provides some indication of the relative e⁄ectiveness of job
search methods. This data suggests that there are only small di⁄erences in the
e⁄ectiveness of job search methods in terms of gaining employment. Of course,
the fact that individuals use multiple job methods make any inference about
e⁄ectiveness of job search methods based on this type of information at best
approximate.
In the following analysis we aggregate search methods. Speci￿cally, we group
the use of the PEA and advertisements into one category, ￿ formal￿job ￿nding
methods. This is necessary due to relatively small numbers of displaced work-
ers ￿nding work through each of these methods separately. As a result, exits
from unemployment are assigned as being due to one of four types of job search
methods: formal, direct approach, friends/relatives or other. Our primary in-
terest is in the e⁄ect of the two ￿ informal￿job search methods, direct approach
and contacting friends/relatives on job search and subsequent labour market
outcomes of displaced workers. As a result, formal methods are used as the
omitted category in the empirical analysis of wages and post-employment sta-
bility. In addition, individuals may exit unemployment into self-employment,
business ownership or other non-employee forms of work. Although these do
not have an associated job search strategy, we treat these as a separate form
of exit from unemployment rather than, for instance, treating them as censored
unemployment spells.
INSERT TABLE 2
Table 2 presents an overview of characteristics of the ￿rst re-employment job,
9along with information on general job stability after displacement, summarised
by job ￿nding method. It is immediately noticeable that a large proportion of
these job spells ￿nish before the end of the sample period (between 71 and 82 per
cent). Moreover, the length of these job spells is relatively short, just over half a
year. Job length appears particularly short for re-employment found through di-
rect approach or friends/relatives. These job ￿nding methods are also associated
with a higher likelihood of subsequent displacement, perhaps re￿ ecting a bias
in informal job networks towards short-term or unstable jobs. Roughly half of
displaced workers are re-employed in the same occupation group, whilst around
a quarter are re-employed in a lower skill occupation. It is noticeable that job
￿nding through either direct approach or friends/relatives is associated with a
higher likelihood of re-employment in the same industry and occupation when
compared to formal job ￿nding methods. This is supportive of the view that
workers￿informal job networks are stronger and/or more e⁄ective within the
same industry and occupation that they were displaced from. The link between
changing occupation, industry and re-employment methods are investigated in
more detail below.
III. RESULTS
A. Exits to Re-employment and Job Search Methods
Our ￿rst step is to examine any association between job search methods
and re-employment outcomes for displaced workers. This is investigated by
examining the relationship between the duration time in search (unemployment)
after displacement, exit to re-employment and job search methods. To do this
10we utilise competing risk models for duration data where re-employment by each
respective job search method is treated as a separate exit state. Speci￿cally, we
allow for the following exit states: formal methods (advertisements and the
public employment agency), direct approach, friends/relatives, other methods
and self-employment. We adopt a semi-parametric competing risk approach
with a gamma frailty to control for unobserved heterogeneity. More details of
the estimation method are presented in appendix 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1.
Figure 1 displays the estimated quarterly baseline hazards across 18 months
for the exit states associated with the four job search methods (and exit to self-
employment). This is for exits to the ￿rst re-employment episode for individuals
who had lost work through displacement. Estimates are from semi-parametric
competing risk models. Baseline hazards are reported for models which include
(solid line) and those that do not include a gamma frailty term to capture unob-
served heterogeneity (dashed line). The overall shape of the two baseline hazard
is of interest as they reveal time patterns of exit to re-employment by di⁄ering
job ￿nding methods. Di⁄erences between the homogenous and heterogenous
estimates of the baseline hazard are of interest insofar as they reveal a potential
role for unobserved job seeker attributes. Of particular relevance here is the
e⁄ect of introducing a control for unobserved heterogeneity on estimated base-
line hazards to employment via the two informal job ￿nding methods, direct
approach and friends/relatives. If the introduction of a term for individual un-
observed heterogeneity ￿ ￿ attens￿these hazards in the early periods of job search
11this re￿ ects that individuals with superior unobservable attributes exit via this
job search method early. This may be indicative of better quality displaced
workers using informal job search methods to signal their underlying productiv-
ity.
Looking at the baseline hazards, re-employment through both informal job
search methods displays negative duration dependence. The conditional proba-
bility of exit to re-employment is approximately 9% and 6% in the ￿rst quarter
of search for friends/relatives and direct approach, respectively. These probabil-
ities decline to around 2%-3% for those still in search after a year. The overall
estimated hazard of exit via informal job search is markedly higher than that
for formal job search methods. The combined probability of exit in the ￿rst
quarter of search is approximately 15% for informal job search as compared to
approximately 6% for formal methods. Unlike the raw data presented in Table
1, this suggests marked variations in the underlying e⁄ectiveness of informal ver-
sus formal job search methods for displaced workers. Exits to employment via
friends/relatives decline rapidly after 3 months of job search. This suggests that
displaced workers exhaust e⁄ective social job networks relatively early during the
unemployment spell. However, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity leads to
marked ￿ attening of the baseline hazard for re-employment via direct approach,
to the extent that there is no longer any noticeable duration dependence. Hence,
the high early hazard rate in the homogeneous model is generated primarily by
individuals with superior unobservable characteristics using this method early
in the search period to ￿nd re-employment. This is supportive of the view that
12(relatively) high productivity displaced workers use this type of informal job
search to signal their productivity early in the post-displacement period. There
is, however, no di⁄erence in the estimated baseline hazard between heterogenous
and homogenous models for exits to re-employment by using friends/relatives
(or also formal methods). There is some slight reduction in the hazard rate to
re-employment via formal methods over time in search.
INSERT TABLE 3
Table 3 presents covariate estimates from competing risk models of re-
employment. To aid interpretation, for each covariate and for each exit state
we report the simulated marginal e⁄ect of the covariate on probability of exit
(Pr): These are computed as set out in (8-10) within the appendix. We restrict
our comments to those covariates that are statistically signi￿cant at standard
levels. Older displaced workers are less likely to exit to re-employment through
direct approach. Workers aged 40 to 49 were more likely to exit unemploy-
ment via the use of friends/relatives. There is some indication that those with
diploma/vocational training quali￿cations or who were employed in a medium
skill occupation (trade and intermediate production) are more likely to exit
through informal job search methods. Generally, however, there are only lim-
ited e⁄ects related to the characteristics of displaced workers.
B. The Wage Impact of Re-employment Method
A key issue for displaced workers is the loss of earnings that occurs across
displacement and re-employment jobs. We seek to gauge the link between search
methods and post-displacement wage losses. First, we examine the e⁄ect of the
13job ￿nding method on the change between pre and post-displacement wages.
This can be speci￿ed as:
lnWr
i -lnWd
i = ￿0 + ￿Xi + ￿JSMi + "i (1)
Where the superscripts r and d refer to the re￿employment and displacement
episode, respectively; lnWi is the log weekly wage of the ith individual; Xi is a
vector of controls; JSMi is the job ￿nding method for the ith individual; and "i
is an I.I.D. error term. Through this approach our primary aim is to examine
how job search methods mitigate (or worsen) post-displacement wage losses.
The controls in the vector Xi are generally standard, however one deserves
further discussion. Changes in wages between displacement and re-employment
jobs will be related to the loss of job, occupation and industry speci￿c human
capital. To address this we include tenure in the displacement job in the control
vector.
INSERT TABLE 4
Column 2 of Table 4 presents OLS estimates of equation (1). The sample
for this model excludes individuals who exited to a ￿ non-employee￿labour mar-
ket state as these individuals did not generally report wage earnings.2 There
is evidence that ￿nding re-employment via direct approach, friends/relatives or
￿ other￿methods is associated with a higher wage change (12-13%) when com-
pared to displaced workers who were re-employed using formal methods, the
omitted category. Other estimates suggest that displaced workers with degree
quali￿cations experience substantial wage rate growth, all other things being
14equal, between the displaced and reemployment job. Having longer tenure and
hence more job-speci￿c human capital in the displaced job is associated with
wage rate reductions, although the magnitude of this e⁄ect is not large. More
explicitly, one may want to control for whether the worker changed occupation
or industry between the two jobs. Variants of (1) were estimated that included
controls for whether the worker changed industry or occupation between dis-
placement and re-employment job. Whilst the estimates were negative signed,
as would be expected, neither were statistically signi￿cant at standard levels.
The previous section demonstrated a link between job ￿nding method and
duration of unemployment. If reservation wages vary across time in unemploy-
ment this may lead to a link between job search methods that have lower average
associated unemployment duration and the average wages associated with gain-
ing a job through these methods. To investigate this we included a control for
duration of time in unemployment following displacement and re-estimated (1).
The resultant estimates were not statistically signi￿cant. Critically, the inclu-
sion of this control did not change the magnitude and statistical signi￿cance of
the point estimates for job ￿nding methods. This was also true of the inclusion
of controls for changing industry and occupation. Hence, it does not appear
that the higher wages, all others equal, related to informal job ￿nding methods
relative to formal methods are a result of variations in unemployment duration
or the likelihood of changing industry/occupation across job ￿nding methods.
A potential problem with the OLS estimates is that we do not observe re-
employment wages if the displaced worker does not re-enter employment within
15the sample period. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that these individuals will
be a random subsample of displaced workers insofar as they are more likely
to possess characteristics (both observed and unobserved) that make it less
probable that they will ￿nd employment. In the case that these individuals are
a non-random subsample of displaced workers, OLS estimates of wages changes
will be biased. To investigate this, we utilise a two-stage model that aims to
control for sample selectivity in the estimates of wage change (Heckman 1979).
The ￿rst stage is to estimate the probability of re-employment:
Pr(Ei) = ￿0 + ￿Xi + ￿
i (2)
We do not observe the underlying probability of being employed, E￿
i , instead
we observe a dummy variable, Ei; de￿ned as Ei = 1 if E￿
i > 0 and Ei = 0
otherwise. Equation (2) is estimated by maximum likelihood and the inverse
mill￿ s ratio is used to correct equation (1). This approach seeks to correct the
estimates of the covariates in the wage equation for bias due to the non-random
partial observability of wages.
We identify the model using an instrumental variable approach. The instru-
ment we adopt is whether the individual had a working partner. This ful￿lls
the basic statistical requirements of an instrumental variable. It has a statis-
tically signi￿cant relationship to the probability of being re-employed (p-value
= 0.019), but is statistically unrelated to wage changes between displacement
and re-employment jobs. To test further for instrument validity we employed
16a Hausman exogeneity test. This involved including the residuals from (2) in
(1) and estimating by OLS. A necessary compromise in this approach was to
estimate (2) by OLS so as to retrieve the residuals. This test indicates that the
instrument is exogenous to the log wage di⁄erential.3 A number of studies have
shown that the presence of a working spouse a⁄ects re-employment probability
and unemployment duration, but generally a working spouse has been found to
decrease re-employment probability.4 However, previous Australian research
demonstrates substantial positive correlations between female employment and
male employment within households (Dawkins et al 2005). Our data ￿ts with
this previous Australian evidence insofar as having a working partner increases
the probability of male re-employment.
Column 3 and 4 of Table 4 present the estimates from the selection equa-
tion and the wage change regression that incorporates a correction for sample
selection. The latter estimates provide some suggestion that the impact of
job ￿nding methods indicated by the OLS regression may be upwardly biased.
Point estimates of re-employment method e⁄ects are not, however, statistically
signi￿cantly di⁄erent between the OLS and corrected models.
Overall there appears to be evidence that informal job search networks, when
compared to formal methods, may reduce wage losses between displacement and
re-employment spells. This appears to run counter to suggestions that employee
referrals and social networks are associated with lower wages (Kugler 2003,
Bentolila et al 2009). Instead our estimates are more supportive of a view of
informal job networks as allowing displaced workers to signal their productivity
17and providing superior information on match quality. If this latter case is true,
we would expect relative ￿ at wage-tenure pro￿les for displaced workers who
found re-employment through friends/relatives. Unfortunately, SEUP does not
have a su¢ ciently long duration for this to be investigated.
C. Re-employment Characteristics, Displacement Risk and Job Duration
Stevens (1997) presents evidence that a major source of welfare losses for
displaced workers is ongoing job instability. Search methods used to enter re-
employment may be a critical factor in so far as individuals are more likely to
have informal job networks in the industry and/or occupations from which they
were displaced. As a result, jobs found through these methods are likely to
be associated with an elevated risk of displacement, particularly as ￿rms may
operate last in, ￿rst out ￿ring policies in the face of poor demand conditions.
More generally, job instability may occur due to matching di¢ culties inherent
in the job search process (Jovanovic 1979, Pries 2004). In this case we would
expect there to be a link between displacement and ongoing instability, but this
would not necessarily be associated with any given job search method.
We examine these issues in two main ways, ￿rst we model the risk of separa-
tion from re-employment job, without distinguishing between di⁄erent reasons
for separation. Through this, we seek to determine if there are any general asso-
ciations between search methods and job instability for the displaced. Second,
we explicitly examine the impact of search method on risk of displacement in
the re-employment job.
To model the likelihood of separation from the re-employment job, we utilise
18a single risk analogue of the semi-parametric competing risk hazard model used
above to estimate time until separation from the re-employment job and include
job search methods as regressors. To the extent that an employer-employee
separation represents a revealed poor job match and the time taken to reveal
this will generally be inversely related to how ￿ poor￿this match is, this approach
provides some evidence on the link between job search method and job match
quality for displaced workers.
INSERT FIGURE 2
Figure 2 presents the estimated baseline hazard from this model. Again this
is plotted for both the baseline hazard from the homogeneous model (dotted line)
and the model including a control for individual level unobserved heterogeneity
(smooth line). The ￿rst thing to note is the magnitude of the probability of
exit from the ￿rst post-displacement job. Even after introducing a control for
unobserved heterogeneity the expected underlying probability of exit from the
post-displacement job is over 30% within the ￿rst 90 days. Both models suggests
a degree of negative duration dependence. The ongoing magnitude of risk of
exit between 15% and 25% for the ￿rst 18 months of the post-displacement
job supports the view that post-displacement employment is characterised by
instability (Stevens 1997).
INSERT TABLE 5
Table 5 presents the covariate estimates from this model. The results sug-
gest that when compared to job ￿nding through formal search methods, infor-
mal job search methods are associated with a higher risk of subsequent separa-
19tion. Hence, while results presented earlier suggested that informal job search
methods were associated with shorter post-displacement time in search and a
reduced loss of wages, they are associated with less stable post-displacement
employment. Separate models were also estimated (but not reported) includ-
ing controls for whether the individual changed occupation or industry. These
provided some indication that changing occupation reduces the likelihood of
separation, but had no impact on the estimates of job search method e⁄ects.
INSERT TABLE 6
A critical issue is the extent to which individuals who are displaced face on-
going, or even an increased, risk of being displaced in later jobs. Table 6 presents
results from a probit regression, where the dependent variable is a dummy that
indicates whether individuals lost their ￿rst re-employment job through dis-
placement (displacement risk). To aid interpretation all estimates are reported
as marginal e⁄ects. Re-employment through informal methods, friends/relatives
or direct approach, is associated with a subsequent displacement risk of be-
tween 14 and 16 percentage points higher than those re-employment jobs found
through formal methods. This suggests that displaced workers who use informal
job search methods to ￿nd re-employment may be exposing themselves to an in-
creased risk of further displacement episodes. In the second model we introduce
variables indicating whether the worker changed occupation and/or industry
when they took their post-displacement job. These results suggest that those
who change occupation are 9 percentage points less likely to be subsequently
displaced from their re-employment job. There is no evidence that changing
20industry reduces displacement risk. The occupation e⁄ect could occur for one
of two reasons. These individuals may have moved from an occupation with
declining demand, where the underlying risk of displacement is high, to another
occupation for which demand is not in decline. Alternatively, the ability to move
occupation may indicate the individual has more general skills and/or higher
productivity, which will be associated with lower displacement risk irrespective
of industry or occupation of employment.
INSERT TABLE 7
If informal networks are stronger in the industry and occupation within
which the worker has previously been employed, the use of informal job search
methods may reduce the likelihood of changing occupation. If, in turn, changing
occupation (or industry) reduces displacement risk, the use informal job search
methods may increase the subsequent risk of displacement. Table 2 suggests that
there is a relationship between job ￿nding method and the likelihood of chang-
ing occupation/industry. To investigate this we re-estimate the main model in
Table 6 separately according to whether the individual changed occupation or
changed industry. Estimates are reported in Table 7 where for brevity only the
estimates of job ￿nding method are reported. If the reason why informal job
search methods increase displacement risk is due to workers re-entering jobs
similar to their displaced job where there is ongoing poor demand conditions
the impact on displacement risk should be larger when workers do not change
industry or occupation. This does not appear to be the case. The heightened
risk of displacement associated with informal job search methods is apparent
21irrespective of whether the worker changed occupation or industry. The only ex-
ception being perhaps workers who changed industry and used direct approach.
Here the associated displacement risk is not statistically signi￿cantly higher
than that for formal methods. In unreported estimates a similar strategy was
adopted for separations as a total. Again there did not appear to be marked dif-
ferences between the impact of informal job search methods on separation risk
according to whether workers changed occupation/industry. Together these es-
timates suggest that the heightened separation and displacement risk associated
with informal job search methods is not due to re-employment in occupations
or industries with poor demand conditions. Instead they suggest that these job
search methods are associated more generally with unstable employment.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has investigated the role of job search methods for displaced
workers. The use of informal job search methods is associated with shorter post-
displacement unemployment search duration and increased likelihood of exit
overall when compared to formal job search methods. Furthermore, informal
job search methods appear to generate superior wage outcomes in the initial re-
employment job. There is evidence that re-employment through friends/relatives
reduces wage losses between displacement and post-displacement jobs, relative
to formal methods. This is supportive of the view that informal job networks
allow displaced workers to signal productivity and provide superior information
on match quality (Simon and Warner 1992), and runs counter to suggestions
that employee referrals and social networks are associated with lower wages
22(Kugler 2003, Bentolila et al 2009)
A critical issue for displaced workers is job stability. It has previously been
demonstrated that recurring job loss is a major source of ongoing welfare losses
for displaced workers (Stevens 1997). In our data, the ￿rst re-employment
job appears to be short-lived. Approximately three quarters of re-employment
jobs end within the sample period. Those who ￿nd these jobs through informal
methods face a particularly high rate of separation, and moreover a 14 to 16 per-
centage point increase in displacement risk. These results suggest that displaced
workers who use informal job networks as a method of gaining re-employment
are more likely to face ongoing labour market di¢ culties.
One explanation for these results is that informal job search is more likely
to result in jobs that are similar to the occupation and industry from which the
worker was displaced from. Whilst displaced workers who ￿nd re-employment
through informal job methods are less likely to change industry and occupation,
we ￿nd no evidence that this is the source of their greater probability of sep-
aration and risk of displacement. Instead, our results suggest that jobs found
through informal methods are associated generally with unstable employment.
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27Notes
1This is similar to ￿gures reported for the unemployed in general, see for instance Addison
and Portugal (2002).
2Furthermore, in the case that wage/salary earnings were reported it is not clear whether
self-employed were receiving other renumeration, such as pro￿ts, from their employment.
3F(1,964) = 0.73, p-value = 0.392.
4For instance Solon (1985) ￿nds that having a working spouse has a negative e⁄ect on
gaining re-employment, but only for women, while Dynarski and She⁄rin (1990) ￿nds that
individuals with working spouses are less likely to gain re-employment if they are in receipt
of unemployment insurance.
281 Technical Appendix
Exits to a new employment episode for individual i can be described as a con-
tinuous process with a hazard of:
￿i (t) = ￿(t)exp(x0
i￿) (3)
where ￿(t) is the baseline hazard and x is a vector of observable covariates
(time-invariant) and ￿ is a vector of unknown coe¢ cients. This provides a
version of (3) for estimation. We utilise the discrete time version of this model.
Each individual exits to a new employment episode during interval t ! t +1
with a given probability given they were still in their initial labour force state
(i.e. unemployed) at time t. The discrete time hazard is given by


















denotes the integrated baseline hazard. No particular parametric form is
assumed for ￿ (t) and the model is estimated semi-parametrically. The log
likelihood contribution of a spell of length di is:


















i￿ + ￿ (t)g
where ci is a censoring indicator that takes the value 1 if di is uncensored and
zero otherwise. This speci￿es a single risk model where the ￿0s are interpreted
as the log of a non-parametric piece-wise linear baseline hazard. The data form
a panel with each individual supplying j = 1;2:::di observations. Each exit state
denotes an exit to a di⁄erent destination state. For each destination state, all
observations are zero except the last, where the last is unity only if the individual
exits to that state. Hence, there is a hazard for each j time period for each exit
state. Equation above (6) is estimated separately for each exit state (m). We
assume proportional hazards and so the covariates a⁄ect the hazard through
the complementary log-log link.
Following Andrews et al (2002), we note that the coe¢ cient estimates on the
covariates in these competing risk regressions are di¢ cult to interpret. The exit
risk to state m (￿m) and the expected waiting time until exit via risk m (Em)




















Where s is the survival function at time t.
Hence, we estimate the probability of exit via state m conditional on exiting




;m = 1;2;:::;M: (8)
The baseline hazards used to compute the probabilities are:




x0b ￿ + b ￿mt
oi
m = 1;2;:::;M: (9)
where x is the sample mean. In the empirical chapters we report the marginal













These equations can be used to compute the expected waiting time for each
destination state (E). These waiting times can then be re-estimated with co-
variates given a value of 0 and 1 for dummy variables (for continuous variables
x is moved by one standard error) These provide simulated marginal e⁄ects of
each covariate on the expected waiting time til exit to state (E), (￿E=￿x)
31In addition we include a gamma frailty term in an attempt to control for indi-
vidual level unobserved heterogeneity. With this term included, the conditional
continuous time hazard can be speci￿ed as:
￿i(t) = ￿(t)exp(x
0
i￿ + ￿i) (11)
where the assumption is made that ￿ are random variables (one for each exit
state) distributed as a Gamma variate of unit mean and variance ￿2 and they





































32Figure 1: Estimated Baseline Hazards, Competing Risk to Re-employment by
Job Finding Method.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































38Table 5: Exit from Re-ermployment job, Hazard Estimates
Coe⁄
JSM - Direct Approach 0.392** [0.185]
JSM - Friends 0.420** [0.180]
JSM - Other 0.158 [0.166]
High School -0.342** [0.169]
Diploma/Vocational Training -0.272*** [0.144]
Degree -0.212 [0.259]
Urban -0.144 [0.142]
Non-English Speaking Background -0.414** [0.181]
Age 30 to 39 -0.179 [0.149]
Age 40 to 49 -0.307*** [0.169]




Para Professional -0.129 [0.149]
Medium Skill -0.220 [0.139]
Large Firm -0.411** [0.178]
Job Seeker 0.737* [0.251]
Observations 1864
Log Likelihood -1001.838
Notes: [ ] are the standard errors. *,**, ***
denote signi￿cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
39Table 6: Risk of Displacement from Re-employment Job - Marginal E⁄ects
(I) (II)
JSM - Direct Approach 0.161* [0.048] 0.150* [0.049]
JSM - Friends 0.144* [0.048] 0.136* [0.048]
JSM - Other 0.037 [0.051] 0.027 [0.052]
High School -0.035 [0.048] -0.024 [0.048]
Diploma/Vocational Training -0.079*** [0.042] -0.078*** [0.042]
Degree -0.055 [0.084] -0.054 [0.084]
Urban 0.095** [0.045] 0.089** [0.045]
NESB -0.094*** [0.052] -0.0869*** [0.052]
Age 30 to 39 0.058 [0.045] 0.052 [0.045]
Age 40 to 49 0.035 [0.049] 0.027 [0.049]
Age 50 to 59 0.060 [0.068] 0.063 [0.068]
Reemployed Job Characteristics
Manufacturing 0.039 [0.042] 0.036 [0.042]
Changed Industry -0.030 [0.037]
Professional/Manager -0.142 [0.090] -0.131 [0.090]
Para Professional -0.060 [0.046] 0.061 [0.046]
Medium Skill 0.042 [0.0456] 0.050 [0.042]
Changed Occupation -0.087** [0.036]
Large Firm -0.042 [0.046] -0.035 [0.045]
Job Seeker 0.031 [0.060] 0.033 [0.060]
Observations 679
Log Likelihood -377.233 -372.96
pseudo r
2 0.048 0.052
Notes: [ ] are the standard errors. *,**, *** denote sign￿cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Omitted categories in sets of dummy variables are formal methods, less than high school completion,
Age 20-29 and low skill occupation.
40Table 7: Risk of Displacement from Re-employment Job, Changing Occupation
and Changing Industry - Marginal E⁄ects
Changed Did Not Changed Did Not
Occupation Change Occupation Industry Change Industry
JSM - Direct Approach 0.161* [0.048] 0.150* [0.049] 0.187* [0.068] 0.122 [0.095]
JSM - Friends 0.144* [0.048] 0.136* [0.048] 0.120** [0.064] 0.209** [0.095]
JSM - Other 0.037 [0.051] 0.027 [0.052] -0.004 [0.065] -0.003 [0.072]
Observations 362 317 422 257
Log Likelihood -174.448 -189.128 -219.502 -147.651
pseudo r
2 0.075 0.058 0:060 0.069
Notes: [ ] are the standard errors. *,**, *** denote sign￿cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
All other controls as per Table 6. Omitted categories in sets of dummy variables are formal methods,
less than high school completion, Age 20-29 and low skill occupation.
41Appendix Table A1 Summary Statistics, Male Displaced Workers
Variable Mean
Age
15 to 29 0.508
30 to 39 0.216
40 to 49 0.174
50 to 59 0.102
Non-English Speaking Background 0.159
Highest Educational Quali￿cation
Less than High School 0.489
High School Completion 0.160
Diploma/Vocational Training 0.292
Degree or higher 0.059












Large Firm (100+ Employees) 0.262
Source: SEUP.
42